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Abstract
We consider some well known families of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based, perfect information games
that can be viewed as specical cases of Shapley’s stochastic games. We show that the following tasks are
polynomial time equivalent:
• Solving simple stochastic games,
• solving stochastic mean-payoff games with rewards and probabilities given in unary, and
• solving stochastic mean-payoff games with rewards and probabilities given in binary.
1 Introduction
We consider some well known families of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based, perfect information games that
can be viewed as specical cases of Shapley’s stochastic games [12]. They have appeared under various names
in the literature in the last 50 years and variants of them have been rediscovered many times by various
research communities. For brevity, in this paper we shall refer to them by the name of the researcher who
first (as far as we know) singled them out.
• Condon games [5] (a.k.a. simple stochastic games). A Condon game is given by a directed graph
G = (V,E) with a partition of the vertices into V1 (vertices beloning to Player 1, V2 (vertices belonging
to Player 2), VR (random vertices), and a special terminal vertex 1. Vertices of VR have exactly two
outgong arcs, the terminal vertex 1 has none, while all vertices in V1, V2 have at least one outgoing arc.
Between moves, a pebble is resting at one of the vertices u. If u belongs to a player, this player should
strategically pick an outgoing arc from u and move the pebble along this edge to another vertex. If
u is a vertex in VR, nature picks an outgoing arc from u uniformly at random and moves the pebble
along this arc. The objective of the game for Player 1 is to reach 1 and should play so as to maximize
his probability of doing so. The objective for Player 2 is to prevent Player 1 from reaching 1.
• Gillette games [7]. A Gillette game G is given by a finite set of states S, partioned into S1 (states
belonging to Player 1) and S2 (states belonging to Player 2). To each state u is associated a finite set of
possible actions. To each such action is associated a real-valued reward and a probability distribution
on states. At any point in time of play, the game is in a particular state i. The player to move chooses
an action strategically and the corresponding award is paid by Player 2 to Player 1. Then, nature
chooses the next state at random according to the probability distribution associated with the action.
The play continues forever and the accumulated reward may therefore be unbounded. Fortunately,
there are ways of associating a finite payoff to the players in spite of this and more ways than one (so
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G is not just one game, but really a family of games): For discounted Gillette games, we fix a discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) and define the payoff to Player 1 to be
∞∑
i=0
βiri
where ri is the reward incurred at stage i of the game. We shall denote the resulting game Gβ . For
undiscounted Gillette game we define the payoff to Player 1 to be the limiting average payoff
lim inf
n→∞ (
n∑
i=0
ri)/(n+ 1).
We shall denote the resulting game G1.
Undiscounted Gillette games have recently been referred to as stochastic mean-payoff games in the computer
science literature [2]. A natural restriction of Gillette games is to deterministic transitions (i.e., all probability
distributions put all probability mass on one state). This class of games has been studied in the computer
science literature under the names of cyclic games [8] and mean-payoff games [13].
A strategy for a game is a (possibly randomized) procedure for selecting which arc or action to take, given
the history of the play so far. A pure, positional strategy is the very special case of this where the choice is
deterministic and only depends on the current vertex (or state), i.e., a pure, positional strategy is simply a
map from vertices (for Gillette games, states) to vertices (for Gillette games, actions).
A strategy x∗ for Player 1 is said to be optimal if for all vertices (states) i it holds that,
inf
y∈S2
µi(x∗, y) ≥ sup
x∈S1
inf
y∈S2
µi(x, y) (1)
where S1 (S2) is the set of strategies for Player 1 (Player 2) and µi(x, y) is the probability that Player 1
will end up in 1 (for the case of Condon games) or the expected payoff of Player 1 (for the case of Gillette
games) when players play using the strategy profile (x, y) and the play starts in vertex (state) i. Similarly,
a strategy y∗ for Player 2 is said to be optimal if
sup
x∈S1
µi(x, y∗) ≤ inf
y∈S2
sup
x∈S1
µi(x, y). (2)
For all games described here, a proof of Liggett and Lippman [10] (fixing a bug of a proof of Gillette [7])
shows that there are optimal, pure, positional strategies and that a pair of such strategies form an exact
Nash equilibrium of the game. These facts imply that when testing whether conditions (1) and (2) holds, it
is enough to take the inifima and suprema over the finite set of pure, positional strategies of the players.
In this paper, we consider solving games. By solving a game we mean the task of computing a pair of
optimal pure, positional strategies, given a description of the game as input1. To be able to finitely represent
the games, we assume that the discount factor, rewards and probabilities are rational numbers and given as
fractions.
It is well known that Condon games can be seen as a special case of undiscounted Gillette games (as
described in the proof of Lemma 4 below), but a priori, solving Gillette games could be harder. A recent
paper by Chatterjee and Henzinger [2] shows that solving so-called stochastic parity games [1, 3] reduces
to solving undiscounted Gillette games. This motivates the study of the complexity of the latter task. We
show that the extra expressive power (compared to Condon games) of having rewards during the game in
fact does not change the computational complexity of solving the games. More precisely, our main theorem
is:
1One may also define solving a game as computing its value (or comparing its value to a fixed number, as in [5]). For
the games considerd here, this is polynomial time (Turing) equivalent to finding optimal strategies. Our reductions are more
coveniently described in terms of finding optimal strategies rather than values.
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Theorem 1. The following tasks are polynomial time equivalent:
1. Solving Condon games (a.k.a.., simple stochastic games)
2. Solving undiscounted Gillette games (a.k.a, stochastic mean-payoff games) with rewards and probabili-
ties represented in binary notation.
3. Solving undiscounted Gillette games with rewards and probabilities represented in unary notation.
4. Solving discounted Gillette games with discount factor, rewards and probabilities represented in binary
notation.
In particular, there is a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for solving undiscounted Gillette games if and
only if there is a polynomial time algorithm for this task. The theorem follows from the Lemmas 2,3,4 below
and the fact that solving games with numbers in the input represented in unary trivially reduces to solving
games with numbers in the input represented in binary. The proof techniques are fairly standard (although
coming from two different communities), but we find it worth pointing out that they together imply the
theorem above since it is relevant, did not seem to be known2, and may even be considered slightly surprising,
as deterministic undiscounted Gillette games can be solved in pseudopolynomial time [8, 13], while solving
them in polynomial time remains a challenging open problem. An even more challenging problem is solving
simple stochastic games in polynomial time, so our theorem may be interpreted as a hardness result. Note
that a “missing bullet” in the theorem is solving discounted Gillette games given in unary notation. It is
in fact known that this can be done in polynomial time (even if only the discount factor is given in unary
while rewards and probabilities are given in binary), see Littman [11, Theorem 3.4].
2 Proofs
Lemma 1. Let G be a Gillette game with n states and all transition probabilities and rewards being
fractions with integral numerators and denominators, all of absolute value at most M . Let β∗ = 1 −
((n!)222n+3M2n
2
)−1 and let β ∈ [β∗, 1]. Then, any optimal pure stationary strategy (for either player)
in the discounted Gillette game Gβ is also an optimal strategy in the undiscounted Gillette game G1.
Proof. The fact that some β∗ with the desired property exists is explicit in the proof of Theorem 1 of Liggett
and Lippman [10]. Here, we derive a concrete value for β∗. From the proof of Liggett and Lippman, we have
that for x∗ to be an optimal pure stationary strategy (for Player 1) in G1, it is sufficient to be an optimal
pure stationary strategy in Gβ for all values of β sufficiently close to 1, i.e., to satisfy the inequalities
min
y∈S′2
µiβ(x
∗, y) ≥ max
x∈S′1
min
y∈S′2
µiβ(x, y)
for all states i and for all values of β sufficiently close to 1, where S′1 (S
′
2) is the set of pure, positional,
strategies for Player 1 (2) and µiβ is the expected payoff when game starts in position i and the discount
factor is β. Similarly, for y∗ to be an optimal pure stationary strategy (for Player 1) in G2, it is sufficient
to be an optimal pure stationary strategy in Gβ for all values of β sufficiently close to 1, i.e., to satisfy the
inequalities
max
x∈S′1
µiβ(x, y
∗) ≤ min
y∈S′2
max
x∈S′1
µiβ(x, y).
So, we can prove the lemma by showing that for all states i and all pure stationary strategies x, y, z, u, the
sign of µiβ(x, y)− µiβ(z, u) is the same for all β ≥ β∗. For fixed strategies x, y we have that vi = µiβ(x, y) is
the expected total reward in a discounted Markov process and is therefore given by the formula (see [9])
v = (I − βQ)−1r, (3)
2Although Condon [5] observed that the case of Gillette games with immediate rewards reduces to Condon games and Zwick
and Paterson [13] that deterministic Gillette games reduce to Condon games.
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where v is the vector of µβ(x, y) values, one for each state, Q is the matrix of transition probabilities and r
is the vector of rewards (note that for fixed positional strategies x, y, rewards can be assigned to states in
the natural way). Let γ = 1 − β. Then, (3) is a system of linear equations in the unknowns v, where each
coefficient is of the form aijγ + bij where aij , bij are rational numbers with numerators with absolute value
bounded by 2M and with denominators with absolute value bounded by M . By multiplying the equations
with all denominators, we can in fact assume that aij , bij are integers of absolute value less than 2Mn. Solving
the equations using Cramer’s rule, we may write an entry of v as a quotient between determinants of n× n
matrices containing terms of the form aijγ + bij . The determinant of such a matrix is a polynomial in γ of
degree n with the coefficient of each term being of absolute value at most n!(2Mn)n = n!2nMn
2
. We denote
these two polynomials p1, p2. Arguing similarly about µβ(z, u) and deriving corresponding polynomials
p3, p4, we have that µiβ(x, y)−µiβ(z, u) ≥ 0 is equivalent to p1(γ)/p2(γ)− p3(γ)/p4(γ) ≥ 0, i.e., p1(γ)p4(γ)−
p3(γ)p2(γ) ≥ 0. Letting q(γ) = p1(γ)p4(γ) − p3(γ)p2(γ), we have that q is a polynomial in γ, with integer
coefficients, all of absolute value at most R = 2(n!)222nM2n
2
. Since 1− β∗ < 1/(2R), the sign of q(γ) is the
same for all γ ≤ 1− β∗, i.e., for all β ≥ β∗. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2. Solving undiscounted Gillette games (with binary representation of rewards and probabilities)
polynomially reduces to solving discounted Gillette games (with binary representation of discount factor,
rewards, and probabilities).
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 1 by observing that the binary representation of the number
β∗ = 1− ((n!)222n+3M2n2)−1 has length polynomial in the size of the representation of the game.
Lemma 3. Solving discounted Gillette game (with binary representation of discount factor, rewards, and
probabilities) polynomially reduces to solving Condon games.
Proof. Zwick and Paterson [13] considered solving deterministic discounted Gillette games, i.e., Gillette
games where the action deterministically determines the transition taken. It is natural to try to generalize
their reduction so that it also works for general discounted Gillette games. Since Condon games allows for
vertices making random choices, a natural attempt is to simply simulate a stochastic transition by such
random vertices. Such a generalization is made even easier by the fact that Zwick and Paterson proved that
solving “augmented” Condon games where random vertices are allowed to take choices given by arbitrary
discrete distributions with rational probability weights (represented in binary) is polynomially equivalent to
solving “plain” Condon games. We find that the reduction outlined above is indeed correct, even though
the correctness proof of Zwick and Paterson has to be modified slightly compared to their proof. The details
follow.
We are given as input a Gillette game form G and a discount factor β and must produce an augmented
Condon game G′ whose solution yields the solution to the Gillette game Gβ . First, we affinely scale and
translate all rewards of G so that they are in the interval [0, 1]. This does not influence the optimal strategies.
Vertices of G′ include all states of G (belonging to the same player in G′ as in G), and, in addition, a random
vertex wu,A for each possible action A of each state u of G. We also add a “trapping” vertex 0 with a single
arc to itself. It does not matter which player it belongs to. We construct the arcs of G′ by adding, for each
(state,action) pair (u,A) the “gadget” indicated in Figure 1. To be precise, if the action has reward r and
leads to states v1, v2, . . . , vk with probability weights p1, p2, . . . , pk, we include in G′ an arc from u to wu,A,
arcs from wu,A to v1, . . . , vk with probability weights (1 − β)p1, . . . , (1 − β)pk, an arc from wu,A to 0 with
probability weight β(1− r) and finally an arc from wu,A to the terminal 1 with probability weight βr.
There is clearly a 1-1 correspondence between pure stationary strategies in G and in G′. Thus, we are
done if we show that the optimal strategies coincide. To see this, fix a strategy profile for the two players
and consider play starting in any vertex u. By construction, if the expected reward of the play in G is h,
the probability that the play in G′ ends up in 1 is exactly βh. Therefore, the two games are strategically
equivalent.
Lemma 4. Solving Condon games polynomially reduces to solving undiscounted Gillette games with unary
representation of rewards and probabilities.
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Figure 1: Reducing discounted Gillette games to Condon games
Proof. We are given a Condon game G (a “plain” one, using the terminology of the previous proof) and
must construct an undiscounted Gillette game G′. States of G′ will coincide with vertices of G, with the
states of G′ including the special terminals 1. Vertices u belonging to a player in G belongs to the same
player in G′. For each outgoing arc of u, we add an action in G′ with reward 0, and with a deterministic
transition to the endpoint of the arc of G. Random vertices of G can be assigned to either player in G′, but
he will only be given a single “dummy choice”: If the random vertex has arcs to v1 and v2, we add a single
action in G′ with reward 0 and transitions into v1, v2, both with probability weight 1/2. The terminal 1 can
be assigned to either player in G′, but again he will be given only a dummy choice: We add a single action
with reward 1 from 1 and with a transition back into 1 with probability weight 1.
There is clearly a 1-1 correspondence between pure stationary strategies in G and strategies in G′. Thus,
we are done if we show that the optimal strategies coincide. To see this, fix a strategy profile for the two
players and consider play starting in any vertex u. By construction, if the probability of the play ending up
in 1 in G is q, the expected limiting average reward of the play in G′ is also q. Therefore, the two games are
strategically equivalent, and we are done.
3 Open problems
Undiscounted Gillette games can be seen as generalizations of Condon games and yet they are computa-
tionally equivalent. It is interesting to ask if further generalizations of Gillette games are also equivalent
to solving Condon games. It seems natural to restrict attention to cases where it is known that optimal,
positional strategies exists. This precludes general stochastic games (but see [4]). An interesting class of
games generalizing undiscounted Gillette games was considered by Filar [6]. Filar’s games allow simultane-
ous moves by the two players. However, for any position, the probability distribution on the next position
can depend on the action of one player only. Filar shows that his games are guaranteed to have optimal,
positional strategies. The optimal strategies are not necessarily pure, but the probabilities they assign to
actions are guaranteed to be rational numbers if rewards and probabilities are rational numbers. So, we ask:
Is solving Filar games polynomial time equivalent to solving Condon games?
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